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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHFIELD CARE CENTER and UTAH 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
-v-
LYDIA J. TORGERSON and UTAH 
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Defendant-Respondents• 
Case No. 20412 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
UTAH STATE INSURANCE FUND 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues to be decided on this appeal are: 
1. Whether the Utah State Industrial Commission abused its 
discretion in ordering the employer to pay for an injury to the 
worker's compensation applicant which occurred on January 20, 1982 
without a finding that the applicant suffered an accident in the 
course of employment. 
2. Whether the Utah State Industrial Commission properly 
allocated responsibility for temporary total compensation and 
medical benefits between the employer and the Second Injury Fund. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a Petition for Review of an Order of the Utah State 
Industrial Commission awarding compensation and medical benefits 
to Ms. Torgerson for back injuries which occurred on July 6, 1980 
and January 20, 1982, and requiring the Second Injury Fund to 
reimburse the employer for only one-third of the temporary total 
compensation and medical benefits it paid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ms, Torgerson began her employment at: Richfield Care 
Center in July of 1979 and continued with the same duties there-
after. Those duties included responsibility for dressing patients 
and getting them ready for their daily routine (R. 21). 
On July 6, 1980, she was sitting a patient in a chair, lost 
her balance and was forced against the wall, striking her back 
(R. 41-42, 58-59). She describes no additional back pain after a 
subsequent hysterectomy and bladder repair she underwent in July 
of 1980 (R. 33-35) . 
At the hearing in this case, Ms. Torgerson described an 
incident which took place on January 20, 1982. She reached to 
pull a T-shirt down over the shoulders of a patient who was 
sitting up in bed when she experienced a pain in her back (R. 21-
24, 58-59). 
After the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge, in Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated May 4, 1983, made the 
following Findings: 
The 1980 incident was clearly an industrial 
accident, but no claim was made by the 
applicant for that incident. The only event 
for which a claim is being made is for an 
incident that occurred on January 20, 1982 
(R. 134). 
The Administrative Law Judge went on to find: 
There was nothing unusual about the activities 
on the morning of January 20, 1982 nor was 
there any unusual strain, twisting, fall, bump 
or even an unusual movement. 
In the this (sic) case there was no unusual 
exertion nor anything unusual about the 
activities of the applicant. There was no 
unanticipated, unintended occurrence different 
from what would normally be expected to occur 
and there was no unforeseen or unexpected 
event to precipitate the symptoms complained 
of by the applicant (R. 135) (See Attachment 
A). 
The Administrative Law Judge, relying on Sabo's Electronic Service 
v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 774 (Utah 1982), determined that the incident 
described on January 20, 1982 did not constitute an injury by 
accident (R. 135). 
On January 3, 1984, the applicant's attorney filed a Motion 
for Review or Supplemental Order requesting that the Commission 
reconsider the Findings of the Administrative Law Judge as to the 
incident of January 20, 1982, and also allow for amendment of the 
application to include a claim on the July 6, 1980 incident 
(R. 143-145) . While that Motion was untimely, the Commission, 
through the Administrative Law Judge, ordered the case reopened 
because notice had not been received by the applicant's attorney 
of the prior Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 147-148, 
152-154) (see Attachment B). 
The case was referred to an independent medical panel 
consisting of Dr. Frank Dituri and Dr. Mark Greene. They found 
that Ms. Torgerson suffered a 2.5% impairment of the whole body 
attributable to the July 6, 1980 industrial accident, a 2.5% whole 
body impairment attributable to conditions existing prior to July 
3 
6, 1980, and a 2.5% impairment attributable to the incident of 
January 20, 1982 (R. 164-166)• 
The Administrative Law Judge then entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on October 3, 1984 which allowed for 
amendment of the application for hearing to include the July 6, 
1980 incident which the Administrative Law Judge found to be an 
accident in the course of employment. The Administrative Law 
Judge further concluded: 
Though the Administrative Law Judge found the 
1982 incident did not amount to an accident 
for which benefits could be recovered in the 
first order, we now find that the applicant is 
entitled to benefits as a result of the 1982 
incident inasmuch as it was an incident v/hich 
aggravated a previous industrial injury with 
the same employer. 
The Administrative Law Judge further concluded that: 
The defendant employer and the State Insurance 
Fund are entitled to reimbursement from the 
Second Injury Fund for payments of temporary 
total disability and medical expenses based on 
ratio of 2.5 over 7.5, or 33% (R. 178) (see 
Attachment C). 
A Motion for Review was filed by the Utah State Insurance Fund on 
the 18th of October, 1984 (R. 181-185) (see Attachment D). The 
Industrial Commission of Utah denied the Motion for Review on 
December 13, 1984 without additional findings (R. 186) (see 
Attachment E). 
A Petition for Review and Docketing Statement were filed with 
this Court requesting a review of the Industrial Commission's 
Order on January 7, 1985 (R. 188-192). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The employer and its compensation insurer, the Utah State 
Insurance Fund, argue that the Utah State Industrial Commission 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously and in excess of its authority 
in two respects: 
1. By awarding compensation and medical benefits to Ms. Tor-
gerson for injuries suffered on January 20, 1982 after the 
Administrative Law Judge found that the injuries on that date did 
not result from an accident, 
2. By failing to allocate 50% of the temporary total 
compensation and medical benefits resulting from the July 6, 1980 
accident to the Second Injury Fund in accord with the medical 
panel findings adopted by the Administrative Law Judge. 
ARGUMENT 
PQIflT I 
RICHFIELD CARE CENTER AND/OR THE UTAH STATE 
INSURANCE FUND HAVE NO LIABILITY ARISING OUT 
OF THE INCIDENT OF JANUARY 20
 f 1982, AND THE 
COMMISSION'S ORDER IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRI-
CIOUS. 
The Administrative Law Judge in his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order of May 4, 1983 applied the proper 
standard announced by this Court in determining that Ms. Torgerson 
had not suffered a "injury by accident" during the incident of 
January 20, 1982. The standards set forth by the Legislature of 
the State of Utah in determining whether or not an injury which 
occurs in the course of employment is compensable is stated 
specifically in Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-45 (1953) as follows: 
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Every employee • . . who is injured . . . by 
accident arising out of or in the course of 
his employment . , . shall be entitled to 
receive . . . such compensation for loss 
sustained on account of such injury . . . . 
(See Attachment F for the complete language of Section 45) . The 
Administrative Law Judgefs complete findings were: 
The applicant had worked at the Richfield Care 
Center since July 1979 with her principal 
duties being to help dress patients and 
prepare them for their daily routine which 
required constant lifting, supporting, 
maneuvering, and dressing patients every 
morning or, if on a different shift, doing 
similar work preparing patients for bed. 
There was nothing unusual about the activities 
on the morning of January 20, 1982, nor was 
there any unusual strain, twisting, fall, bump 
or even an unusual movement. 
In the this (sic) case there was no unusual 
exertion nor anything unusual about the 
activities of the applicant. There was no 
unanticipated, unintended occurrence different 
from what would normally be expected to occur 
and there was no unforeseen or unexpected 
event to precipitate the symptoms complained 
of by the applicant. The movements being made 
by the applicant were movements made hundreds 
of time (sic) before and, at, least, as to 
straightening the patients' clothes, were no 
different than movements made by any ordinary 
person in the process of doing everyday 
activities such as dressing and undressing. 
The Administrative Law Judge went on to cite Sabof s Electronic 
Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 772 (Utah 1982). Relying upon the Sabo 
decision, the Administrative Law Judge found the activities of 
Ms. Torgerson were similar to the activities Mr. Sabo was involved 
in, both had pre-existing back problems, and the work activities 
complained of required very little exertion. 
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It is the position of the Utah State Insurance Fund that the 
Administrative Law Judge was correct in his Findings of Fact that 
Ms. Torgerson had done nothing unusual, had experienced no unusual 
strain, twisting, fall, bump or unusual movement; therefore her 
activities on January 20, 1982 fell directly in line with the Sabo 
decision. The incident of January 20, 1982 was not an "injury by 
accident" as required by Section 45, and petitioners herein cannot 
be held liable for the medical expenses, time off work or perma-
nent impairment from that injury. 
The Administrative Law Judge, in his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order dated October 3, 1984, held the State 
Insurance Fund liable for compensation and medical expenses 
arising out of the 1982 incident: 
The Administrative Law Judge found the 1982 
incident did not amount to an accident for 
which benefits could be recovered in the first 
order. We now find that the applicant is 
entitled to benefits as a result of the 1982 
incident inasmuch as it was an incident which 
aggravated a previous industrial injury with 
the same employer. 
The Administrative Law Judge never reconsidered or overturned his 
prior findings that the incident of January 20, 1982 was not an 
unusual exertion, did not involve extraordinary stress, and 
therefore was clearly within the Sabo guidelines. There are no 
provisions in the Utah worker fs compensation statute to hold an 
employer liable for additional compensation and medical benefits 
for the aggravation of an industrial injury caused by ordinary 
daily activity. The provisions of Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-45 
establish the threshold which an applicant must meet in order for 
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any injury to be compensable* That Section requires that the 
injury be the result of an industrial accident: in the course 
of employment. 
This Court, in gileg vf industrial Cpmrojigg-Lon Q £ Utah/ . 
P.2d (slip op. 19711 filed October 25, 1984)
 f overturned the 
Industrial Commission's Order denying that Mr* Giles had incurred 
an industrial accident and reinstated the Administrative Law 
Judge's finding that an accident had occurred, primarily because 
there were no substitute findings of fact to substantiate the 
Commission's Order, In the case at bar, the Administrative Law 
Judge's Order of October 3, 1984 contained no findings that an 
accident had occurred in the course of employment on January 20, 
1982. The Commission's denial of plaintiff's Motion for Review 
contained no additional findings of fact, but simply adopted the 
Administrative Law Judge's findings. Therefore, the only findings 
in this record relating to the January 20, 1982 incident were the 
findings of the Administrative Law Judge in his Order dated May 4, 
1983. He found the January 20, 1982 incident did not constitute 
an unusual or unexpected stress or exertion, but was the normal 
daily activity of the applicant herein. Thus, there is no finding 
of accident in the record upon which an award can be based. 
This Court has long held that its standard of review on 
factual matters will be: 
whether the Commission's findings are "arbi-
trary or capricious" or "wholly without cause" 
or contrary to the "one (inevitable) conclu-
sion from the evidence" or without "any 
substantial evidence" to support them. Only 
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then should the Commission's findings be 
displaced. 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi. 631 P.2d 888f 890 (Utah 1981). 
The record clearly establishes that Ms. Torgerson, at the time she 
felt pain in her back on January 20, 1982, was not engaged in any 
lifting, straining or unusual exertion. Her descriptions of the 
events of January 20, 1982 clearly provide sufficient evidence for 
the Administrative Law Judge to make the Findings that he made on 
May 4, 1983. It is those Findings (the only findings regarding 
the January 20, 1982 incident in the record) to which this Court 
must apply its standard of review. 
Clearly, the finding that this was not an accident in the 
course of employment is not arbitrary or capricious, or v/holly 
without cause; therefore this Court must uphold those findings. 
By relying on this Court's decision in Sabo, the Administrative 
Law Judge clearly applied the appropriate legal standard in his 
Order of May 4, 1983 to the facts as he found them in determining 
that no accident had occurred. Since the employer's liability is 
contingent upon an accident under the provisions of Section 
35-1-45, the Order of the Commission requiring the State Insurance 
Fund to pay compensation for the incident of January 20, 1982 must 
not stand. 
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PQIPT XI 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IMPROPERLY 
ALLOCATED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TEMPORARY 
TOTAL COMPENSATION AND MEDICAL BENEFITS 
BETWEEN THE STATE INSURANCE FUND AND THE 
SECOND INJURY FUND. 
As the facts clearly set forth, the Industrial Commission was 
considering applications for compensation on two distinct indus-
trial occurrences in this case. The first occurrence, which the 
State Insurance Fund does not contest, was an industrial accident 
which happened on July 6, 1980. The medical panel found that 
prior to July 6, 1980, Ms. Torgerson had a 2.5% permanent bodily 
impairment due to a prior injury to her back. The medical panel 
also found that the July 6, 1980 incident increased that impair-
ment to her back by another 2.5%. The medical panel then went on 
to consider the impairment resulting from the January 20, 1982 
occurrence, which the Administrative Law Judge had already found 
did not constitute an accident. The panel attributed 2.5% perma-
nent bodily impairment to that occurrence. 
The Administrative Law Judge, in making his calculations to 
determine the amount of contribution the Second Injury Fund should 
make, treated the 1980 and 1982 incidents as a single industrial 
incident. This Court has consistently held that the Commission 
must consider separate accidents serially in order to determine 
physical impairment attributable to each accident, and also the 
relationship each accident bears to a person's total physical 
impairment. &&£ Jacobson Construction & Industrial Indemnity 
Co. v. Hare, 667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983); Northwest Q^xi^r&a Inq,r 
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v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981); Second 
Injury Fund v. Perry's Mill & Cabinet, 684 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1984). 
In Jacobson Construction v. Hare, this Court clearly illus-
trated to the Commission the proper method for converting whole 
man impairment to partial man impairment ratings based on a series 
of events. Mr. Hare, who had a 25% congenital impairment, later 
suffered a 10% whole man impairment, and finally suffered a 50% 
whole man impairment from an industrial accident. This Court 
subtracted the 25% initial impairment from 100% whole man, 
resulting in a 75% whole man for rating purposes. Thus, when the 
10% whole man impairment acted upon the 75% man, it resulted in an 
8% increase of impairment, thus leaving Mr. Hare a 67% man for 
rating purposes. The Court thus held that the 50% whole man 
impairment acting upon the 67% man for impairment rating purposes 
resulted in a 34% increase in impairment of Mr. Hare. 
This is a clear illustration of the proper allocation of 
serial impairments. In the instant case, Ms. Torgerson, following 
the incident of July 6, 1980, was a 5% impaired person (deter-
mining partial person figures on such low values and then rounding 
those figures off is insignificant; the easiest way to treat this 
incident is to use the whole person impairment rating given by the 
medical panel), 2.5% being due to pre-existing conditions and 2.5% 
being due to the industrial accident of July 6, 1980. Thus, the 
proper allocation of responsibility for temporary total compensa-
tion and medical expenses is 50% to be paid by the employer and 
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its insurance carrier and 50% to be paid by the Second Injury 
Fund. 
While it is the position of the State Insurance Fund that 
this Court need not consider the impairment resulting from the 
occurrence of January 20, 1982 since no accident occur red, if the 
additional impairment of that date is to be considered, then the 
2.5% increase in impairment (rounded to 3%) acted upon a 95% 
impaired person, the partial person figure would be rounded to 3%f 
thus resulting in a total impairment to Ms. Torgerson of 8%. 
In Secor^ Injury Fun^ V. Pgrry'g Mill & Cabinet, aUE£3r this Court 
reaffirmed the method for determining Second Injury Fund liabil-
ity. The method is to require the Second Injury Fund to pay a 
percentage of temporary total compensation and medical expense 
based on the ratio pre-existing impairment bears to total impair-
ment. The Second Injury Fund, on the January 20, 1982 incident, 
would be liable for 5/8ths of the temporary total compensation and 
medical benefits, and the State Insurance Fund would be liable for 
3/8ths. Instead, by combining all of the figures, treating the 
1980 and 1982 incidents as one, the Administrative Law Judge found 
the State Insurance Fund liable for two-thirds of the temporary 
total compensation from both incidents. This is clear error under 
this Court's previously established criteria for determining 
proportional liability under Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69 
(1976, as amended 1983). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts contained in the record, this Court should 
order that because there are no findings to substantiate an 
industrial accident on January 20, 1982, the State Insurance Fund 
and Richfield Care Center are liable only for the impairment to 
Ms. Torgerson resulting from the 1980 industrial accident. Thus, 
the State Insurance Fund would be liable for 2.5% permanent 
partial impairment, and the Second Injury Fund would be liable for 
2.5% permanent partial impairment. The temporary total compensa-
tion and medical benefits are then properly allocated 50% to the 
Second Injury Fund and 50% to the Utah State Insurance Fund. 
DATED this ^ T T a y of March, 1985. 
BLACK & MOORE 
Fred R. Silvest'er 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed 4 true and exact copies of the 
foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, this 
to the following: 
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Michael J. Labrum 
10 8 North Main 
Richfield, UT 84701 
Stephen Schwendiman 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Gilbert A. Martinez 
Second Injury Fund 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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LYD1A J. TORGERSON, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
RICHFIELD CARE CENTER, 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
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i^Fy 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room, Utah Industrial Commission, 160 East 
300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 25, 1983, 
at 10:00 o'clock a.m. Said hearing was pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by Michael 
R. Labrum, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants Richfield Care Center and State 
Insurance Fund were represented by Fred Silvester, 
Attorney at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Gilbert A. 
Martinez, Administrator. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
During the course of her employment with the defendant company on or 
about July 6, 1980 the applicant was trying to place a patient in a chair and 
fell striking first the wall and then hitting the floor. She suffered pain in 
the low back area which was medically treated apparently in a hospital. Three 
days later, surgery was performed for a hysterectomy and to repair a ruptured 
bladder. The applicant maintained it was the ruptured bladder that hurt rath-
er than an injury back. The applicant indicated that she had no further pain 
in her back or treatment for her back. However, a letter from Dr. Henrie, an 
orthopedic physician, indicates that he examined her at the Richfield Hospital 
on July 10, 1980: 
LYDIA J . TOFGEfcSON 
ORDER 
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"in regards to her complaints of low back pain which she dates to an 
accident occurring while at work for the Richfield Care Center on July 
6, 1980." 
The doctor reported that on July 11 the patient was still having: 
"aching through the low back area, difficulty moving or turning and 
had some difficulty in getting to an erect posture because of pain and 
discomfort.11 
The applicant further admitted on cross-examination that she wore a 
back brace continuously from July 1980 until January 1983 to protect her back, 
but denied any back problems during that period. The 1980 incident was clear-
ly an industrial accident, but no claim is made by the applicant for that in-
cident. The only event for which a claim is being made is for an incident 
that occurred on January 20, 1982. In the written application the applicant 
described the incident as: 
"Getting a patient up for daily routine, lifted patient with right arm 
and reached to straighten up his clothes around shoulder." 
At the hearing, the applicant further described the patient as a man 
weighing about 190 pounds who was lying down on a bed. Mrs. Torgerson had 
raised the patient to a sitting position, was supporting him with the hand, 
reached to pull a T-shirt over his head when she felt a pain in her lower 
back. The pain was severe, making it difficult to straighten up. She im-
mediately reported the incident to the office and was told to fill out an ac-
cident report and go home. She drove herself home and was taken to a clinic 
by her daughter. She was examined by Dr. Smoot, given some medication, with 
bed rest and physical therapy recommended. Applicant returned to work on 
March 3, 1982 and was still having some back aches and some pain down the left 
leg, but worked 2 1/2 months until the condition became more severe. The ap-
plicant changed to Dr. Jackson who examined her on June 29, 1982 and recom-
mended traction at the hospital and when conservative treatment did not help a 
CAT scan was taken at the University of Utah Hospital which was followed by 
surgery in September 1982. The applicant was released from the hospital on 
September 23, 1983 with an excellent result. Mrs. Torgerson was released to 
return to work in January of 1983 with a 5% permanent partial impairment rat-
ing. 
The applicant had worked at the Richfield Care Center since July 1979 
with her principal duties being to help dress patients and prepare them for 
their daily routine which required constant lifting, supporting, manuvering, 
and dressing patients every morning or, if on a different shift, doing similar 
LYD1A J. TORGKRSON 
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work preparing patients for bed. There was nothing unusual about the ac-
tivities on the morning of January 20, 1982 nor was there any unusual strain, 
twisting, fall, bump or even an unusual movement. 
In the this case there was no unusual exertion nor anything unusual 
about the activities of the applicant. There was no unanticipated, unintended 
occurrence different from what would normally be expected to occur and there 
was no unforeseen or unexpected events to precipitate the symptoms complained 
of by the applicant. The movements being made by the applicant were movements 
made hundred of times before and ,at least, as to straightening the patient's 
clothes, were no different than movements made by any ordinary person in the 
process of doing everyday activities such as dressing and undressing. 
The case is directly in point with the recent decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, decided 
February 19, 1982. The Court held in the Sabo case that when Sabo suffered a 
pain in his back reaching down to lift a box of clock radios the incident 
could not be held to be an accident even though the results were immediate. 
The Administrativbe Law Judge at first denied benefits in the Sabo case fol-
lowed by the Commission's Order to remand to a medical panel. The medical 
panel found a relationship between the applicant's employment activities and 
the subsequent medical complications. A subsequent Order by the Commission 
finding an accident occurred was reversed by the Supreme Court with a finding 
of "no accident". There is a further similarity in that the applicant in both 
cases had a pre-existing back problem and the activities involved required 
very little exertion. 
In light of the statutory definition, the law and recent cases from the 
Supreme Court, the Administrative Law Judge finds that no industrial accident 
occurred in this case and therefore that the applicant is not entitled to 
workmen's compensation benefits. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Application should be denied. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Application be, and the same is hereby, 
denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall 
be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof specifying in 
detail the particular errors and objections and unless so filed this Order 
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
LYD1A J. TORGKRSON 
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Keith E. Sohm 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, .Salt Lake City,,^  Utah this 
*?<*j^ day of "*"/ / '• >'' • 
1933. 
i 
Linda Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
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State Insurance Fund, 560 South 300 East, SLC, UT 84111 
Fred Silvester, Atty., Suie 500, Ten W Broadway, SLC, UT 
84101 
Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
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ATTACHMENT B 
1NDUSTR1 U. COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SCOT! M MAUILSON, CJONLRNOR WALTIRT AXLLC.NRD. CHMRMW 
SI I PHI N M HADLl >. COMMISSION! U 
MILTON E SAATHOf f, c OMMISMOM R 
February 21, 1984 
Michael R. Labrura, Esquire 
Labrura & Taylor 
Attorneys at Law 
108 North Main 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Fred Silvester, Esquire 
Black & Moore 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gentlemen: 
The State Insurance Fund, through its counsel Bruce Wilson, declined to 
enter into an agreement for compensating the Applicant, Mr. Wilson took the 
position that further consideration of the 1980 injury was barred by the three 
year Statute of Limitations. 
The Hearing was held before the three year Statute of Limitation expired. 
I am considering the disclosures at the Hearing together with the medical 
reports making reference to the 1980 incident as sufficient notice to the 
Commission to satisfy the requirements of Section 35-1-99 and therefore rule 
that claims based on the 1980 incident are not barred by the Statute of 
Limitations. 
The Applicant is instructed to file an Application for the 1980 incident 
and the matter will be referred to a Medical Panel for its evaluation of claims 
associated with that incident. I still suggest the parties settle the matter 
and a compromise on five percent or an agreed lesser figure may be in the best 
interests of all parties. 
BY DIRECTION: 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Keith E. Sohm 
Administrative Law Judge 
KES:dmh 
cc: Lydia J. Torgerson, 595 South 800 West, Richfield, UT 84701 
State Insurance Fund, Attn: Bruce Wilson, Attorney at Law 
Second Injury Fund, Attn: Gilbert Martinez, Administrator 
Re: Lydia Torgerson 
Inj: 01-20-82 
Emp: Richfield Care Center 
THE 
LYDIA J. TORGERSON, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
RICHFIELD CARE CENTER, 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
*V *.'-• *> %'* *** *** *t- *}* »*# »'* mX+ *£» %J* 
An Order was entered in this case denying benefits to the Applicant 
based on the 1982 incident. The Order acknowledged that the Applicant may 
have been involved in an accident during the course of her employment with 
Defendant Company on July 6, 1980 but no Application had been filed for that 
incident. The Applicant, by and through her attorney, filed a Motion for 
Reviex<7 requesting the Law Judge take official notice of the July 6, 1980 
incident and refer the matter to the Medical Panel to evaluate that industrial 
injury along with the January 20, 1982 incident. 
The Defendants contended, in response to that Motion, that the 1980 
incident was barred by the three year Statute of Limitations in Section 
35-1-99. The Administrative Law Judge finds that the Hearing was held in 
this case April 25,' 1983 and at the Hearing there was a sufficient disclosure 
regarding the July 1980 industrial injury together with with medical reports 
to be considered notice to the Commission sufficient to meet the tests of 
Section 35-1-99 and that those disclosures, of course, were provided the 
Commission in less than three years. 
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the Motion to reopen and 
refer the matter to a Medical Panel is well taken. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAU: 
The Order of May 4, 1983 should be set aside and the matter 
reopened and referred to a Mcdica] Panel for evaluation allowing the Medical 
Panel to evaluate' the affects of the July 1980 accident along with the 
January 20, 1982 incident. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
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dated May 4, 1983 be, and is hereby, set aside, that the Applicant file an 
Application involving the July 6, 1980 incident and that the matter be 
referred to a Medical Panel for evaluation in connection with both the 1980 
and 1982 incidents. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
4 1 ^ 
Keith E. Sohm 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 2-/ 
ATTF.H : 
/«/ Linda J, Strasburr 
Lind;: J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on 
U^ v^  ^L 19 E4-
a copy of the attached ORDI 
was mailed to the following persons a t the following 
addresses , postage pa id : 
Lydia J . Torgerson 
595 South 800 West 
R i c h f i e l d , Utah 84701 
R i c h f i e l d Care Center 
1000 North Main 
R i c h f i e l d , Utah 84 701 
Fred S i l v e s t e r , Esqui re 
Black & Moore 
Attorneys at Law 
261 East 300 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Michael R. Labrum 
Attorney at Law 
108 North Main 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
State Insurance Fund 
560 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gilbert A. Martinez 
Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By >/,; 
Diana M. IK 
Secretarv_ 
ci;m: T 
ATTACHMENT C 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 83000039 
LYDIA J. TORGERSON, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
RICHFIELD CARE CENTER, 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 25, 
1983 at 10:00 A.M. O'clock. Said Hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Keith E. Sohm, Administrative Law Judge. 
The Applicant was present and represented by Michael 
R. Labrum, Attorney at Law. 
The Defendants were represented by Fred Silvester, 
Attorney at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Gilbert A. 
Martinez, Administrative Law Judge. 
The original Application was filed to consider an incident which 
occurred January 20, 1982. No claim was made for a 1980 incident. After 
considering all the facts the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order May 4, 
1983 denying the Application as to the January 20, 1982 incident inasmuch as 
the facts in connection with that incident did not constitute an accident. 
All of the facts in the case are set forth in detail in that report. 
Thereafter, the Applicant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and an 
Application for benefits pursuant to the 1980 injury and an Application for 
Relief in connection with the 1980 injury was also provided by the Applicant. 
The Defendants objected to the reopening and claimed a Three Year Statute of 
Limitations barred the Applicant from further consideration in that matter. 
An Order was issued by the Administrative Law Judge reopening the case and 
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setting aside the Order of May 4, 1983 and referring to a Medical Panel for 
evaluation as to the effects of the July 1980 accident along with the January 
20, 1982 incident. 
The Applicant began work with the Defendant Company July 1979 with 
her principal duties being to help dress patients and prepare them for their 
daily routine which required the Applicant to be constantly lifting, 
supporting, manuvering, and dressing patients every morning or preparing the 
patients for bed. During the course of her employment with the Defendant 
Company on or about July 6, 1980 the Applicant was trying to place a patient 
in a chair and fell striking first the wall and then hitting the floor. She 
suffered pain in the low back area which was medically treated apparently in 
the Hospital. Three days later surgery was performed for a hysterectomy and 
to repair a ruptured bladder. The Applicant thought that it was the ruptured 
bladder that hurt rather than the injured back. The Applicant indicated that 
she had no further pain in her back or treatment for her back, however, a 
letter from Dr. Henry, an Orthopedic Physician indicates that he examined her 
at the Richfield Hospital on July 10, 1980 in regards to low back pains. The 
Applicant indicated on cross-examination that she wore a back brace 
continually from July 1980 until January 1983. 
The medical aspects of the case were referred to a Medical Panel for 
evaluation. The Medical Panel returned its Report copies of which were 
circulated to all of the parties as was a Supplemental Report. There being no 
Objection to the Medical Panel Reports the same are received in evidence, the 
Findings therein adopted by the Administrative Law Judge as his own which are 
as follows: 
There is no medically-demonstrable causal connection between the 
problems in her bladder and uterus and the industrial accident. 
Based upon the review of medical records, these conditions are the 
normal conditions found in a woman of middle age who has had 
several pregnancies. 
As far as the herniated disk at L4-5 is concerned, it is the 
opinion of the Panel that this is related to the industrial 
accident. It is our opinion that this began with the injury of 
1978, was aggravated by the injury of 1980, and was further 
aggravated and required surgery following the injury of 1982, 
2. The periods of time during which the applicant was temporarily 
totally disabled as a result of the industrial injury were from 
January 20, 1982, to March 3rd, 1982, and from June 29th, 1982, 
until she returned to work in January of 1983. 
3. The applicant's total physical impairment is related to the 
disk herniation and her low back problem. We note that Doctor 
Jackson gives her a permanent partial impairment of 5 per cent of 
the whole body. The Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
TORGERSON 
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Impairment of the American Medical Association state that a 
surgically-operated disk with no residuals rates as a 5 per cent 
impairment of the whole body. The Recommendations of the Academy 
of Orthopedic Surgeons states that a surgically-operated disk 
rates as a 10 per cent impairment of the whole body. 
We note that Doctor Jackson, the treating physician, rates her as a 
5 per cent impairment of the whole body. This would be consistent 
with the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment of the 
American Medical Association in that she has had an operated disk 
&nd, based upon all examinations, she has no residuals. She does 
not complain of pain, there is no motor weakness or atrophy, and 
physical examination shows no significant neurological defect. 
Because of the discrepancy between the two rating systems, it 
is the opinion of the panel that we should average the two and 
rate her permanent partial impairment as 7 fit 1/2 percent of the 
whole body. 
A. The percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable 
to the accident of July 6th, 1980, is 2 & 1/2 per cent of the whole 
body. The permanent impairment related to the accident of 
January 20th, 1982 is 2 & 1/2 per cent of the whole body. 
5. The percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable 
to conditions prior to July 6th, 1980, is 2 & 1/2 per cent of the 
whole body. 
6. It is our opinion that the injuries of 1980 and 1982 did medically 
aggravate the pre-existing impaired condition of the Applicant. 
7. The hysterectomy done in 1980 was not required as a result of the 
industrial accident. The treatment by Doctor Smoot in 1982 and the 
surgery done by Doctor Jackson on her low back in 1982 were required 
as a result of the industrial injury. 
8. It is the opinion of the panel that Ms. Torgerson will require 
no further treatment including surgery or medication as a result of 
the industrial injury. 
The Law Judge finds that there was no causal connection between the 
bladder and uterus problems and the industrial accidents but that there was a 
causal connection between the herniated disk and the industrial accidents with 
the problem beginning with an injury of 1978 aggravated by the injury of 1980 
and further aggravated and requiring surgery following the injury of 1982. 
The Applicant was temporarily totally disabled as a result of the 
LYDIA TORGERSON 
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industrial injuries from January 20, 1982 to March 3, 1982 and from June 29, 
1982 until January 1983. 
The Applicant sustained an overall permanent partial impairment 
rating of 7 & 1/2 per cent of the whole body with 2 & 1/2 per cent assigned to 
the July 1980 incident and 2 & 1/2 per cent assigned to the January 20, 1982 
incident and 2 & 1/2 per cent assigned to the conditions prior to the 1980 
incident. The Panel found that the Applicant should not require further 
treatment or surgery as the result of the industrial injury. 
The Applicant was earning $3.80 an hour working 40 hours a week and 
though she was divorced was responsible for the support of five minor children 
resulting in a weekly entitlement of $126.32 a week. 
Though the Administrative Law Judge found the 1982 incident did not 
amount to an accident for which benefits could be recovered in the first Order 
we now find that the Applicant is entitled to benefits as a result of the 1982 
incident inasmuch as it was an incident which aggravated a previous industrial 
injury with the same employer. The Applicant is entitled to temporary total 
disability compensation for the periods of time indicated above totalling 33 
weeks which when multiplied times $126.32 would equal $4,168.56 less $702.85 
already paid by the Defendant State Insurance Fund for a resultant figure of 
$3,466.00 to be paid by the State Insurance Fund. The Applicant is further 
entitled to benefits based on 5 per cent or 15.6 weeks which when multiplied 
times $126.32 would equal $1,971.00 to be paid by the State Insurance Fund and 
2 & 1/2 per cent or 7.8 weeks times $126.32 which would equal $985.00 to be 
paid by the Second Injury Fund. 
We note that the Defendant Insurance Carrier has paid medical costs 
in the amount of $1,362.48. The Defendant employer and the State Insurance 
Fund are entitled to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for payments of 
temporary total disability and medical expenses based on ratio of 2 & 1/2 over 
7 & 1/2 or 33 per cent. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Defendant should pay the Applicant the sums set forth above. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant employer and Insurance 
Carrier pay the Applicant $3,466.00 for temporary total disability 
compensation and $1,971.00 for permanent partial impairment benefits. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as 
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to pay the Applicant compensation at the 
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rate of $126.32 for 7.6 weeks foe a total of $985.00 as compensation for a 2 & 
1/2 per cent pre-existing permanent physical impairment which sum is to be 
paid in a lump sum and to reimburse the State Insurance Fund to the extent of 
33 per cent of the amounts expended herein for temporary total disability and 
medical expenses upon the filing of a duly Verified Petition certifying the 
amounts thus expended. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants pay all medical expenses 
incurred as the result of this accident in accordance with the Medical and 
Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Michael Labrum, Attorney for the 
Applicant, be paid the sum of $1,284.40, the same to be deducted from the 
aforesaid award. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Keith E. Sohm 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission of , 
Utah, Salt J,ake City, Utah, this .Holi-
day of /Vr^VVV , 1984. 
ATTEST: 
''Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission -Secretary 
'c'^/ff/.XsTcf&r 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on ([/%<,nf)srA l*? , 1934 a copy of 
the attached FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Lydia J. Torgerson 
595 South 800 West 
Richfield, Utah 8A701 
Michael R. Labrum 
Attorney at Law 
108 North Main 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Richfield Care Center 
1000 North Main 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
State Insurance Fund 
560 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fred Silvester 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 500 
Ten West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gilbert A. Martinez 
Administrator 
Second Injury Fund 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Diana 
ATTACHMENT D 
Fred R. Silvester 
BLACK & MOORE 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake Cityf UT 84111 
Telephone: 363-2727 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No, 83000039 
LYDIA J. TORGERSON, 
Applicant, 
-v-
RICHFIELD CARE CENTER, STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, and SECOND 
INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Richfield Care Center and the Utah State Insurance Fund, by 
and through counsel of record, hereby submit the following Motion 
for Review in the above entitled action. 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION SHOULD REINSTATE THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF MAY 4 , 1983 
DECLARING THE INCIDENT ON JANUARY 2 0 , 1982 AS 
NOT CONSTITUTING AN INJURY BY ACCIDENT UNDER 
UTAH LAW, 
The F i n d i n g s of F a c t of t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e s t a t e : 
The a p p l i c a n t had worked a t t h e R i c h f i e l d Care 
C e n t e r s i n c e J u l y of 1979 w i t h h e r p r i n c i p a l 
d u t i e s b e i n g t o h e l p d r e s s p a t i e n t s and 
p r e p a r e t hem f o r t h e i r d a i l y r o u t i n e , which 
r e q u i r e d c o n s t a n t l i f t i n g , s u p p o r t i n g , 
m a n e u v e r i n g , a n d d r e s s i n g p a t i e n t s e v e r y 
m o r n i n g o r , i f on a d i f f e r e n t s h i f t , d o i n g 
s i m i l a r w o r k p r e p a r i n g p a t i e n t s f o r b e d . 
T h e r e was n o t h i n g u n u s u a l a b o u t t h e a c t i v i t i e s 
on t h e m o r n i n g of J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1982 no r was 
there any unusual strain, twisting, fallf 
bump, or even an unusual movement. 
In the this (sic) case there was no unusual 
exertion nor anything unusual about the 
activities of the applicant. There was no 
unanticipated, unintended occurrence different 
from what would normally be expected to occur, 
and there was no unforeseen or unexpected 
event to precipitate the symptoms complained 
of by the applicant. The movements being made 
by the applicant were movements made hundreds 
of times before and, at least, as to the 
straightening of patients1 clothes, were no 
different from movements made by any ordinary 
person in the process of doing everyday 
activities such as dressing and undressing. 
It is the position of the Utah State Insurance Fund that this is 
an accurate statement reflecting the testimony of the applicant at 
hearing. As the Administrative Law Judge accurately pointed out 
in his first Order, the Findings are directly in point with Sabo 
and do not constitute an injury by accident. 
The Administrative Law Judge did not reverse these Findings 
in his Order of October 3, 1984; but, rather, found the applicant 
entitled to benefits by finding that this was an aggravation of a 
previous industrial injury with the same employer. The provisions 
of Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-69 in no way modify the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann., Section 35-1-42 which require that in order for 
an applicant to be entitled to compensation, the applicant must 
suffer an injury by accident in the course of employment. 
The facts here are clearly analogous to the Donald Glen Mason 
case, in which Mr. Mason, having pre-existing back difficulties, 
lifted 100-pound bags of whey, and at least on two occasions felt 
pain in his back. In Mason the Supreme Court clearly found 
2 
that since an accident did not occur in the course of employment, 
Mr. Mason was not entitled to compensation. 
Based on this law, the Administrative Law Judge fs Findings 
of Fact and his May 1983 Order constitute the proper findings in 
this case, and the Utah State Insurance Fund respectfully requests 
the Commission to reverse the award of compensation based on the 
non-accidental occurrence of January 20, 1982. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE 1982 INCIDENT CONSTITUTED AN 
INJURY BY ACCIDENT, THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGE SHOULD ADJUST HIS CALCULATIONS REGARDING 
THE RATE OF COMPENSATION WHICH THE APPLICANT 
IS ENTITLED TO AND THE AMOUNT OF REIMBURSEMENT 
DUE FROM THE SECOND INJURY FUND. 
The medical panel appointed by the Administrative Law Judge 
found, and the Administrative Law Judge agreed, that the applicant 
sustained an overall permanent partial impairment of 7.5% of the 
whole body. The medical panel allocated this by indicating that 
2.5% of that impairment pre-existed the incident of July of 1980, 
2.5% was caused by the incident of July of 1980, and 2.5% was 
caused by the incident of January 20, 1982. The Administrative 
Law Judge found that the applicant was earning $3.80 per hour for 
a 40-hour week, but failed to review the record to determine that 
that was the rate of pay for the 1982 occurrence. There is 
nothing in the record regarding the applicant's rate of pay during 
1980; therefore it is improper to calculate the entire compensa-
tion rate based on the 1982 rate. 
Further, since this is an application for compensation for 
two industrial incidents, because the Administrative Law Judge 
3 
allowed for amendment of the application to claim two incidents 
(one in 1980 and one in 1982), those incidents must be calculated 
separately. Therefore, if in fact the applicant suffered an 
increase in impairment from 2.5% which was not attributable to 
industrial causes to 5% as a result of the 1980 incident, the Utah 
State Insurance Fund, having paid temporary total compensation and 
medical benefits on that incident, would be entitled to a 50% 
reimbursement for all temporary total compensation and medical 
benefits attributable to the 1980 incident. 
In addition, if the 1982 incident is determined to be an 
accident, clearly the State Insurance Fund would be liable for the 
permanent partial impairment attributable to that incident; but, 
having satisfied its temporary total and medical expense obliga-
tion on the 1980 incident, the 2.5% attributable to pre-existing 
conditions and the 2.5% permanent impairment attributable to the 
1980 incident would be pre-existing conditions, pursuant to 
Section 69; therefore the State Insurance Fund would be entitled 
to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for two-thirds of the 
medicals and temporary total compensation on the 1982 incident 
since the combined disabilities of the 1982 incident show 2.5% 
permanent partial impairment attributable to the 1982 incident and 
5% permanent partial impairment pre-existing the 1982 incident. 
Therefore, even if the Commission were to find that the 1982 
incident was an injury by accident, it is respectfully requested 
that the 1980 and 1982 incidents be treated as separate applica-
tions, which they are, and the calculations made separately on 
4 
each entitling the Utah State Insurance Fund to 50% reimbursement 
for temporary total compensation and medical benefits paid on the 
1982 incident, and entitling the State Insurance Fund to a 
two-thirds reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for medical 
benefits and temporary total compensation to be paid on the 1982 
incident* It could be argued further that failure of the appli-
cant to prove all the elements necessary for compensation, namely 
her wage rate, on the 1980 incident should preclude recovery on 
that incident, 
DATED this UBLtJl day of October, 1984. 
BLACK & MOORE 
Fred R, Silvester 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Motion for Review, postage prepaid, this HLfcJbi day of 
October, 1984, to the following: 
Gilbert A, Martinez Michael J* Labrum 
Second Injury Fund 108 North Main 
160 East 300 South Richfield, UT 84701 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
State Insurance Fund 
560 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ATTACHMENT E 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 83000039 
LYDIA J. TORGERSON, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
RICHFIELD CARE CENTER and/or 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
S^ e \tv 0
v^°e 
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DENIAL OF 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On or about October 3, 1984, an Order was entered by an Administra-
tive Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above 
entitled case. 
On or about October 19, 1984, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Defendants by and through their attorney. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge affirmed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge dated October 3, 1984, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and 
the Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah,, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
_day of December, 1984. 
Walter T. Axelgard # 
T*lM' /If Plfi 
Commission Secretary 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Commissioner 
Lenice L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on December^ _, 1984 a copy of the 
attached Denial of Motion for Review was mailed to the following persons at 
the following addresses, postage paid: 
Lydia J. Torgerson, 595 South 800 Vest, Richfield, UT 84701 
Michael R. Labrum, Atty., 108 North Main, Richfield, UT 84701 
State Insurance Fund, 560 South 300 East, SLC, UT 84111 
Fred Silvester, Atty., 261 East 300 South, #300, SLC, UT 84111 
Gilbert A. Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fun 
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ATTACHMENT F 
35-1-45 LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
per month" at the end of subd. (4); and made 
minor changes in phraseology. 
Business of employer. 
Owner of ten parcels of real property on 
which were 19 rental units which owner 
actively managed was in the rental business, 
and employee he hired to paint and repair 
units for forty hours a month was not within 
the exclusion of subd. (2) of this section. 
Sorenson v. Industrial Comm. (1979) 59S P 2d 
362. 
Accident. 
Death of employee who had a preexisting 
heart weakness was the result of an "acci-
dent" arising out of and in the course of 
employment where death by heart attack 
occurred while working on the job, and 
because of a mechanical defect in the truck 
the employee was operating he was required 
to repeatedly hoist himself up into the cab, 
requiring a greater exertion than would have 
been required had the truck been working 
properly. Nuzum v. Roosendahl Constr. & 
Mining Corp. (1977) 565 P 2d 1144. 
An internal failure brought about by exer-
tion in the course of employment may be an 
accident without the requirement that the 
injury result from some incident which hap-
pened suddenly and is identifiable at a defi-
nite time and place; however, there must be a 
causal connection between the injury and the 
employment. Schmidt v. Industrial Comm. of 
Utah (1980) 617 P 2d 693. 
Accident is an unanticipated, unintended 
occurrence different from what would nor-
mally be expected to occur in the usual 
course of events; thus, if an employee incurs 
unexpected injuries, including internal fail-
ures caused by the duties of his employment 
he is eligible for compensation under this 
section. Painter Motor Co. v.Ostler (1980) 617 
P 2d 975. 
Evidence that employee experienced a 
"catch" in his back while shoveling rock in 
the course of his employment was sufficient, 
in light of his history of work-related back 
injuries and medical condition, to establish 
that such shoveling incident could have 
added to or aggravated a job-induced preex-
isting back condition and that the injury and 
disability caused by the incident resulted 
from an accident. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Monfredi (1981) 631 P 2d 888. 
Claimant failed to prove that back injury 
received while engaged in his employment 
was the result of an accident where there 
Loaned employee. 
Where employee of trucking company was 
assigned by the company to haul a load of 
wood paneling for the defendant and directed 
by the company to assist defendant's employ-
ees in loading the truck, for purposes of this 
act the truck driver became defendant's 
employee during the loading process, and 
when he was injured in the course of it, his 
remedy against defendant was limited to the 
collection of workmen's compensation bene-
fits. Bambrough v. Bethers (1976) 552 P 2d 
1286. 
was no evidence that showed anything 
unusual about his activities on the day of the 
injury or any unusual exertion or strain or 
contact with objects or a fall. Sabo's Elec-
tronic Service v. Sabo (1982) 642 P 2d 722. 
Aggravation or acceleration of injury or 
[ disease. 
Compensation was denied a truck driver 
; who underwent surgery following two 1975 
; incidents of back discomfort on the job, 
: which aggravated driver's scoliosis of the 
spine and spondylolysis, both of which condi-
tions developed after a trucking accident suf-
L fered in 1972, since the type of work he was 
J engaged in at the time of the 1975 incidents 
was not unusual or unexpected and the 
aggravation of his physical condition gradu-
i ally developed without the intervention of 
i any external occurrence or trauma. Farmers 
Grain Cooperative v. Mason (1980) 606 P 2d 
237. 
Arising out of or in course of employment. 
1 Where the evidence affirmatively shows 
3 that the assigned duties of a traveling sales-
man include keeping his car in a safe and 
efficient running condition, there is a reason-
 able basis to support the commission's find-
1 ings that injury to him while he was working 
on his car arose within the scope of his 
i employment. Hafer's, Inc. v. Industrial 
i Comm. of Utah (1974) 526 P 2d 1188. 
Claimant was not entitled to compensation 
i as a result of an automobile accident at the 
I end of a claimed business and pleasure trip, 
2 where the trip was primarily to visit a per-
sonal friend and former employer of the 
i claimant and the business end of the trip 
I could have been accomplished in the claim-
ant's office. Martinson v. W-M Insurance 
Agency, Inc. (1980) 606 P 2d 256. 
/ A truck driver whose practice was to take 
home a tractor to clean and service it with 
 the knowledge of his employers was acting in 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
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the course of his employment when he was Medical services. 
killed in an accident on his way home from Import of this section is that medicals are 
his place of employment. Kinne v. Industrial something additional to and separate from 
Comm. (1980) 609 P 2d 926. the compensation. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
Conduct of employee in running to investi- Industrial Comm. (1979) 597 P 2d 875. 
gate and to offer help when it appeared that Self-inflicted injuries, 
a fellow emplovee might he in danger or dis- ,ir, , , , , • c . . . 
. . , , i , When emp oyee slammed his fist against a 
tress was a natural and reasonably , , , . .. J . , , .. 7 
expectable reaction so that his subsequent loKc.ked' f allonfy, J?et*1 d°° r > li ™ f ° T f " death from heart attack was an accident able and exacted that injury would result to 
4 c u• • ~ i. c 4. 4-u 4. his hand; the injury was therefore not an arising out of his employment fact that -J * J *. ui / «.u 
, A u A \ i. *. AW accident, and not compensable (reversing the deceased had a preexisting heart condition
 T , . . \ n . . , , , , ., 
,., . ) A c A- IL
 t u- A *u Industrial Commissions award based on its did not preclude finding that his death
 r ,. t, . ,, . . , ,- . a. . ,, 
u , c • i r • 4-u c finding that the injury was not self-inflicted), resulted from an accident in the course of
 x, Tr ^ « i-A <. • t n / i n ^ 
, .
 TT ^ , «. . o. i n McKay Dee Hosp. v. Industrial Comm. (1979) employment. United States Steel Corp. v. nqopoH 'm Draper (1980) 613 P 2d 508. 
Burden of proof. Law Reviews. Schmidt v. Industrial Commission and 
The burden of proof in workmen's compen- i n j u r y Compensability under Utah Worker's 
sation cases is proof by a preponderance of Compensation Law: A Just Result or Just 
the evidence. Lipman v. Industrial Comm. Another "Living Corpse"?, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 
(1979) 592 P 2d 616. 393. 
35-1-46. Employers to secu re compensa t ion — Ways al lowed — F a i l u r e — 
Not ice — In junc t ion — Viola t ion — P e n a l t y . Employers including counties, 
cities, towns and school districts shall secure compensation to their employees in 
one of the following ways: (1) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of 
such compensation with the state insurance fund, which payments shall commence 
within 90 days of any final award of the commission. 
(2) By insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of such compensation with 
any stock corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the business of 
workmen's compensation insurance in this state, which payments shall commence 
within 90 days of any final award by the commission. 
(3) By furnishing annually to the commission satisfactory proof of financial 
ability to pay direct compensation in the amount, in the manner and when due 
as provided for in this title, which payments shall commence within 90 days of 
any final award by the commission. In such cases the commission may in its discre-
tion require the deposit of acceptable security, indemnity or bond to secure the pay-
ment of compensation liabilities as they are incurred, and may at any time change 
or modify its findings of fact herein provided for, if in its judgment such action 
is necessary or desirable to secure or assure a strict compliance with all the provi-
sions of law relating to the payment of compensation and the furnishing of medical, 
nurse and hospital services, medicines and burial expenses to injured, and to the 
dependents of killed employees. The commission may in proper cases revoke any 
employer's privilege as a self-insurer. 
The commission is hereby authorized and empowered to maintain a suit in any 
court of the state to enjoin any employer, within the provisions of this act, from 
further operation of the employer's business, where the employer has failed to 
insure or to keep insured in one of the three ways in this section provided, the 
payment of compensation to injured employees, and upon a showing of such failure 
to insure the court shall enjoin the further operation of such business until such 
time as such insurance has been obtained by the employer. The court may enjoin 
the employer without requiring bond from the commission. 
If the commission has reason to believe that an employer of one or more employ-
ees is conducting a business without securing the payment of compensation in one 
of the three ways provided in this section, the commission may give such employer 
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